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EXTINGUISHING THE COMMON LAW
FIREMAN'S RULE:
FLOWERS V. ROCK CREEK TERRACE,
308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987)
The fireman's rule prohibits firefighters and police officers from in-
itating tort claims against persons whose negligent conduct causes fires
or other perils that injure the officers. 1 Traditionally, state courts have
based the fireman's rule on the common law theories of landowner lia-
bility2 and assumption of the risk.' In Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace,4
the Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected the landowner liability ra-
tionale and held that public policy best supported imposition of the
fireman's rule.5
In Flowers, a volunteer firefighter, while fighting a fire, fell down an
open elevator shaft and sustained permanent injuries.6 The firefighter
sued the owners of Rock Creek Terrace, the security company, and the
manufacturer of the elevator for failure to maintain the apartment
building in a safe condition.7 The defendants demurred to the plain-
tiff's charges, believing that the fireman's rule barred the cause of ac-
1. See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152
(1977). See generally Annotation, Liability of Owner or Occupant of Premises to Fire-
man Coming Thereon in Discharge of His Duty, 11 A.L.R.4th 598 (1982).
2. See, eg., Todd v. Armour and Co., 44 Ga. App. 609, 162 S.E. 394 (1931) ("the
uniform and universal holding of all the courts" is that the fireman is a licensee to
whom the landowner owes no duty). Id. at 609, 162 S.E. at 394.
3. See, e.g., Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646
(1922) (dismissing wrongful death action because the fireman assumed the risk that "the
burning shed would fall on him").
4. 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).
5. Id. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.
6. Id. at 434, 520 A.2d at 363.
7. Flowers filed a sixteen-count declaration against the defendants, alleging that de-
fendant building owners and security company knew of "prior suspicious fires" and
failed to take precautions against future fires. He also claimed Rock Creek failed to
adopt reasonable safety measures. Finally, Flowers alleged that the elevator was not
fireproof and that defendants failed to warn Flowers of the open elevator shaft. Id
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tion.8 The circuit court9 sustained the demurrers because the
firefighter had incurred injuries during the course of duty." On ap-
peal, the Special Court of Appeals affirmed.1 On writ of certiorari12
the Court of Appeals of Maryland abolished the traditional landowner
liability theory and held that public policy mandates that firefighters
are foreclosed from recovering damages against negligent parties who
create the need for the firefighters' services. 3
Historically, courts have held that a landowner's duty to one enter-
ing his premises depended on the entrant's status as trespasser, licen-
see, or invitee.14 The landowner owes the invitee a duty of reasonable
8. The defendants claimed that the firefighter sustained his injuries during the per-
formance of his duties, arguing that falling down the smoke-filled elevator shaft was a
risk of firefighting. Id.
9. Initially, plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.
Plaintiff then appealed the judgment to Maryland's Court of Special Appeals. 308 Md.
at 436, 520 A.2d at 364. The Court of Appeals of Maryland is the state's highest court.
10. Because Flowers sustained injuries in a common area, he alleged that defend-
ants owed him a duty of reasonable care. Under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 345 (1965) a landowner or occupier must exercise reasonable care for public officers
entering property held open to the public. The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected
Flowers' reliance on the Restatement on the basis that § 345, comment c expressly pre-
cludes firefighters and police officers from the duty of care rule. The court found that
the Restatement places firefighters and police officers in the licensee category. 308 Md.
at 434, 520 A.2d at 363. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 345, comment c
(1965).
11. 308 Md. at 434, 520 A.2d at 364.
12. The writ of certiorari presented the question whether landowner liability princi-
ples or the public policy rationale provides the better justification for the fireman's rule.
Id. at 434, 520 A.2d at 364.
13. Id. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.
14. See generally Note, Landowner's Negligence Liability to Persons Entering as a
Matter of Right Under a Privilege of Private Necessity, 19 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1966).
"A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of an-
other without a privilege to do so by the possessor's consent or otherwise." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965); see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS
393-412 (1984). "A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land
only by virtue of the possessor's consent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330
(1965). See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, at 412-19. The Restatement
provides:
An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor. A public invitee is a
person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a
purpose for which the land is held open to the public. A business visitor is a person
who is invited to enter or remain or land for a purpose directly or indirectly con-
nected with business dealings with the possessor of the land.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
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care.15 Because trespassers and licensees enter the land without the
owner's consent, they are not entitled to receive due care.
16
In Gibson v. Leonard'7 the Illinois Supreme Court first used the
landowner liability rationale in a fireman's rule case. The Gibson court
held that the firefighter was a mere licensee to whom the landowner
owed no duty other than to refrain from willful or wanton miscon-
duct."8 Numerous jurisdictions subsequently adopted the fireman's
rule, holding that, absent invitation or statute, a firefighter who entered
the premises in the course of duty was a licensee.1
9
By classifying the firefighter as an invitee, some courts require land-
owners and occupiers to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
15. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 14, at 425. Invitees receive a higher
duty of care. The landowner has a duty to protect an invitee from known or foreseeable
dangers. The owner also must use reasonable care to discover hidden dangers. Id. See,
e.g., Lingerfelt v. Winn-Dixie Texas, Inc., 645 P.2d 485 (Okla. 1982) (store customer is
an invitee). Sian v. Farmer's Deposit Says. Bank, 300 Pa. 85, 150 A. 163 (1930) (bank's
customer is an invitee who is entitled to a duty of due care).
16. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 14, at 393. Because trespassers
enter the land without the owner's permission, the landowner owes them no duty except
to abstain from intentionally injuring the trespassers. Id at 399.
Licensees enter the land without the owner's permission. The owner owes licensees
no duty to keep land in a safe condition. Id The landowner has a duty to warn licen-
sees of hidden dangers of which the owner has knowledge. Id. at 417-18. The land-
owner is also liable to the licensee for injuries caused by the landowner's active
negligence. Id. at 418.
17. 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892). Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Iln. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d
881 (1960) overruled Gibson.
18. 143 Ill. at 190-91, 32 N.E. at 184. The court used Cooley as its sole authority.
Cooley did not distinguish between a licensee and a business invitee. He instead classi-
fied all entrants who had permission to come on to the land as licensees. See T. Coo-
LEY, TORTS 313 (1880). Commentators maintain that Cooley suggests no more than
firefighters enter land without permission. Thus, he does not determine the firefighters'
status. Cooley's omission has led some critics to conclude that the Gibson court's rule
and cases following it have based the fireman's rule on a misinterpretation of Cooley.
See Comment, Are Firemen and Policemen Licensees or Invitees?, 35 MICH. L. REv.
1157, 1158 (1937); Note, Assumption of the Risk and the Fireman's Rule, 7 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 749 (1981).
19. See Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 P. 459 (1910)
(fireman entering a building under legal necessity is a licensee); Roberts v. Rosenblatt,
146 Conn. 110, 148 A.2d 142 (1959) (a fireman entering the premises in performance of
his duties is a licensee); Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N.E. 1113 (1893) (absent
statute or ordinance, a fireman is a licensee); Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 A.
44 (1925) (under the great weight of authority, fireman entering a premises to extin-
guish a fire is a licensee). But see Houston B. & T.R. Co. v. O'Leary, 136 S.W. 601
(Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (firefighter is licensee but landowner has a duty to maintain
premises in a safe condition).
1989]
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condition for the firefighter.2" In Dini v. Naiditch,21 for example, a
fireman's family brought a wrongful death action against the land-
owner for negligently maintaining his property in violation of fire ordi-
nances.22 The Illinois Supreme Court overruled Gibson and allowed
the cause of action against the negligent landowner by classifying the
firefighter as an invitee.23 The court reasoned that the firefighter had a
right to perform his duty on the premises where he "might reasonably
be expected to be."'24 Thus, the court held that the landowner owed
the firefighter a duty of reasonable care.2"
In Krauth v. Geller,26 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
firefighter does not fit into either the licensee or invitee category. 27 In-
stead, the court placed the firefighter in the sui generis28 category,
which applies to those who enter a premises under legal authority
rather than by invitation or consent.29 The court concluded that classi-
20. See, e.g., Mistelske v. Kravco, Inc., 88 Pa. D. & C. 49 (1953) (fireman is an
implied invitee); Strong v. Seattle Stevedore Co., 1 Wash. App. 898, 466 P.2d 545
(1970) (fireman was an invitee because he conferred at least a potential economic benefit
upon landowner). Cf Walsh v. Madison Park Properties, Ltd., 102 N.J. Super. 134,
245 A.2d 512 (1968) (firefighter is classified as a business invitee because his presence
does not depend on an express invitation but rather on implied invitation to perform his
duties on the premises).
21. 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
22. The landowner, in violation of an ordinance, did not equip the building with fire
doors and fire extinguishers. Further violations included trash in the hallways and in-
adequately constructed stairways. Id. at 417, 170 N.E.2d at 886.
23. Id. at 416-17, 170 N.E.2d at 886.
24. Id at 415, 170 N.E.2d at 885. The court referred to the licensee label as "an
illogical anachronism, originating in a vastly different social order, and pock-marked by
judicial refinements." Id. Furthermore, the court noted that "[i]t is highly illogical to
say that a fireman who enters the premises quite independently of either invitation or
consent cannot be an invitee because there has been no invitation, but can be a licensee
even though there has been no permission." Id.
25. 20 Ill. 2d at 416-17, 170 N.E.2d at 886. But see Washington v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 60 Ill. 2d 103, 361 N.E.2d 282 (1976). The Illinois court limited the Dini
holding to a duty of reasonable care to maintain the premises "so as to prevent injury
occurring to a fireman from a cause independent of the fire." Id. This narrow holding
protected the landowner from liability "for negligently causing the fire." Id.
26. 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960).
27. Id. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130.
28. See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951).
Sui generis applies to firefighers because they enter the premises under unique circum-
stances rather than by invitation or consent. Id.
29. 31 N.J. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130. The New Jersey Supreme Court described the
firefighter's unique situation:
A fireman isn't a trespasser for he enters pursuant to public right. Although it is
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fication of firefighters into inappropriate common law categories leads
to consequences derived from an artificially imputed status.3"
Courts have justified application of the fireman's rule by noting that
firefighters often enter a premises at unexpected times or in unusual
ways.3  Thus, some courts hold that landowners and occupiers cannot
prepare for the firefighters' unforeseeable arrival.32 Other jurisdictions
maintain that abolishing the fireman's rule would discourage negligent
landowners and occupiers from seeking firefighters' help because they
would fear tort liability.3 3
To mitigate the harsh effects of the fireman's rule, courts permit
firefighters' tort claims when the hazards causing their injuries extend
beyond the risks reasonably inherent in firefighting.3 4 Liability may be
frequently said that he is a licensee rather than an invitee, it has been correctly
observed that he falls within neither category, for his entry does not depend upon
permission or invitation of the owner or occupier, nor may they deny him
admittance.
Id.
See C. & 0. Ry. v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 154 S.E.2d 650 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
845 (1968) (firefighters are sui generis but the landowner is not liable to the firefighter
for negligently causing the fire). Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., 4 A.D.2d
276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1957); McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 A.D.2d 186,
271 N.Y.S.2d 698, aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 919, 233 N.E.2d 289, 286 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1967);
Buren v. Midwestern Indus., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964) (these cases hold that
firefighters are sui generis because firefighters enter land for public purposes).
30. 31 N.J. at 273, 157 A.2d at 130.
31. See Boneau v. Swift & Co., 66 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Mo. 1934); Shypulski v. Wal-
dorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 397, 45 N.W.2d 549, 551 (1951); Note, New
Minnesota Fireman's Rule, 64 MINN. L. REv. 878, 881 (1980); W. PROSSER & W. KEE-
TON, supra note 14, at 431-32.
32. Id. But see 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.14
(2d ed. 1986) (landowner should be required to exercise a duty of reasonable care to
firefighters under the general negligence standard); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 14, at 432 (instead of imposing the fireman's rule to limit all liability, require land-
owner to exercise due care "only when it is reasonable to expect him to do so"); Note,
supra note 14, at 412-13 (courts should permit firefighters to sue landowners for breach-
ing their duties to any class of entrants; allowing firefighters to assert tort claims against
landowners for breaching a pre-existing duty "would not impose an additional burden"
on the landowner).
33. See, e.g., Steelman v. Lind, 97 Nev. 425, 634 P.2d 666, 667 (1981) (if there is no
fireman's rule, then citizens would be reluctant to seek firefighters' assistance for fear of
a subsequent tort claim). But see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 14, at 432
(refutes the Steelman rationale "as preposterous rubbish"); Christensen v. Murphy, 296
Or. 610, 620, 678 P.2d 1210, 1217 (1984) (agrees with Prosser's assessment of the fire-
man's rule and instead applies the ordinary negligence standard to determine liability to
firefighters).
34. See, e.g., Meirs v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491, 492-93, 167
1989]
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imposed if the landowner or occupier engages in willful or wanton mis-
conduct,3" the landowner or occupier fails to warn of hidden dangers,36
or the peril results from a statutory violation. 7
In Armstrong v. Mailand38 the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected
common law liability classifications and based the fireman's rule on the
assumption of the risk doctrine. The court held that the landowner or
occupier owes the firefighter a duty of reasonable care 39 unless the
N.Y.S. 740 (1920) (firefighters injured during the course of duty when he fell into a coal
hole in an unlit driveway can recover damages from landowner). Anderson v. Cinna-
mon, 365 Mo. 304, 282 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1955) (landowner's negligence is no basis for
firefighters' recovery).
35. See Whitten v. Minnesota-Jade Water and Sewer Auth., 357 So.2d 430, cert.
denied, 364 So.2d 894 (1977); Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 644 P.2d 822,
182 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1982) (fireman has cause of action due to landowner's intentional
misrepresentation that the boilover did not contain toxic materials); Bandosz v. Daigger
and Co., 255 Ill. App. 494 (1930) (fireman's widow may recover damages against land-
owner who intentionally caused the explosion that killed the firefighter); Houston B. &
T.R. Co. v. O'Leary, 136 S.W. 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (owner liable to fireman for
knowing that the railroad car contained explosives).
36. Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prod. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951);
Lave v. Newman, 211 Neb. 97, 317 N.W.2d 779 (1982) (landowner must warn firefight-
ers of hidden dangers where landowner has knowledge of the danger and an opportu-
nity to give warning); Schwab v. Rubel Corp., 286 N.Y. 525, 37 N.E.2d 234 (1941)
(duty to warn fireman of open shafts); James v. Cities Service Oil Co., 140 Ohio St. 314,
23 Ohio Op. 571, 43 N.E.2d 276 (1942) (owner should have warned firefighter of empty
gasoline tank containing explosive vapors located near the fire); Clark v. Corby, 75 Wis.
2d 292, 249 N.W.2d 567 (1977) (duty to warn firefighter of hidden dangers).
37. See Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E.2d 296 (1937) (stor-
age of paints and chemicals in violation of fire ordinance; landowner liable to fireman);
Carroll v. Pellico Bros., Inc., 44 Misc. 2d 832, 255 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1964) (violation of
ordinance makes landowner liable to firefighter). But see Luetje v. Corsini, 126 I11. App.
3d 74, 466 N.E.2d 1304 (1984) (no liability to firefighter for violation of building and
fire codes).
38. 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979). The court had previously abolished landowner
classifications in Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972) (entrant's
status as an invitee or licensee is no longer the sole factor in determining landowner's
liability). See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 104 (1968) (abolished traditional liability classifications and focused on land-
owner's duty to exercise reasonable care to all entrants).
39. 284 N.W.2d at 350. The court required of landowners the same duty of care to
firefighters as they would to all entrants. Id. Applying the same duty to firefighters and
other entrants makes the abolition of landowner liability classifications more consistent.
Id. The Court also mentioned that the reasonable care standard coupled with assump-
tion of the risk enables the court to apply the fireman's rule to nonlandowners and
nonoccupiers. Id.
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firefighter primarily assumes the risk of harm.' The court further
noted that the assumed risk must be reasonably apparent to the
firefighter as part of his occupation.4 '
Although classifying firefighters as sui generis, the New Jersey
Supreme Court based the fireman's rule on both assumption of the risk
and public policy in Krauth v. Geller.4 2 The court observed that the
public pays the firefighter to confront certain hazards.4 3 Thus, the
firefighter cannot complain of the negligence creating the peril that re-
quires him to perform his duties.' Next, the court asserted that, on
the basis of public policy, the negligent individual should not have to
pay for the firefighter's injuries because the public already compensates
the firefighter for assuming the risks inherent in his occupation.45
The Krauth court's analysis has received approval in other jurisdic-
tions.46 In Aravanis v. Eisenberg,4 7 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
40. Id. Primary assumption of the risk is the injured party's express or implied
consent to relieve the defendant of any duty to exercise care. Id. at 351.
41. Id. at 351-52. Defendant summoned firefighters to extinguish a fire near a gaso-
line storage tank. The fire spread and the tank exploded. The firefighters were killed in
the line of duty. The court barred the firefighters' families wrongful death action on the
ground that the firefighters knew of the possibility of an explosion and had primarily
assumed the risk. Id. at 347. See generally Note, supra note 18. See also Note, supra
note 31, at 885 (critical analysis of fireman's rule based on assumption of the risk; au-
thor contends that firefighter must either confront life-threatening risks or lose his job;
fireman's assumption of the risk, therefore, is not voluntary). But see Bartels v. Conti-
nental Oil Co., 384 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1964) (firefighter's family entitled to wrongful
death action due to gasoline storage tank explosion; defendant neglected to warn
firefighers of the hidden danger in the tank's faulty pressure valves). Cf McGee v.
Adams Paper and Twine Co., 26 A.D.2d 186, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1966), aff'd, 20
N.Y.2d 921, 233 N.E.2d 289, 286 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1967) (firefighters assume risks usually
inherent in their work such as risks of contact with flames and smoke and collapse of
ceilings, walls, buildings and floors).
42. 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960).
43. Id. at 272, 157 A.2d at 131.
44. The court compared the firefighter to a contractor. Both are experts hired to
"'remedy dangerous situations." Thus, they cannot complain of the negligence which
requires their expertise. Id.
45 Id.
46. See, e.g., Grable v. Varela, 115 Ariz. 222, 564 P.2d 911 (1977) (firefighter can-
not recover damages against negligent party since the firefighter's occupation requires
him to confront certain risks); Romedy v. Johnson, 193 So. 2d 487 (1967) (firefighter, by
virtue of his voluntary employment, assumes risks of injury due to exposure to fire,
smoke, and collapsing structures); Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 Ill. 2d 103,
361 N.E.2d 282 (1967) (landowner is not liable to firefighter for negligently creating the
hazard since it is the fireman's job to fight fires).
47. 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965).
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considered the Krauth decision.4" Although the court upheld the land-
owner liability rationale,49 it noted that a firefighter cannot recover for
hazards inherent in firefighting regardless of his common law statussO
In Walters v. Sloan"1 the California Supreme Court held that the
fireman's rule bars a police officer's tort claims.52 The court adopted
the Krauth court's view that an officer cannot recover for injuries when
he voluntarily confronts risks in the line of duty.53 Second, the court
developed a public policy rationale based on cost spreading.5 4 The
court recognized that public officers receive tax-funded salaries and
workers' compensation benefits." Thus, public officers receive ade-
quate compensation for injuries resulting from the negligent acts of
48. Id. at 250-51, 206 A.2d at 153. In considering Krauth, the court recognized
that the firefighter, if injured "by the flames of the conflagration," cannot recover dam-
ages. Id. at 250-51, 206 A.2d at 153. The firefighter cannot sue a negligent landowner
due to the nature of his occupation and the compensation he receives for encountering
the risk. Id. at 252, 206 A.2d at 153.
49. Id. at 253, 206 A.2d at 153. The firefighter claimed that the landowner's negli-
gent storage of acetone, rather than the fire itself, caused his injuries. Id. at 253-54, 206
A.2d at 154. The firefighter argued that his status changed from licensee to invitee
because the injury occurred after he had already confronted the risk. Id. at 253-54, 206
A.2d at 155. Although conceding that a change of status does occur in some situations,
the court declined to recognize whether a chronological change in status occurred in
Aravanit Id.
50. Id. at 254, 206 A.2d at 155.
51. 20 Cal.3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977).
52. Id. at 200, 571 P.2d at 610-11, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 154. In Walters, the defend-
ants' minor daughter had a party at their home and served alcoholic beverages to her
minor friends. The police officer sustained injuries while attempting to arrest an intoxi-
cated minor. Id. at 200, 571 P.2d at 610, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
53. Id. at 203-04, 571 P.2d at 612, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 155. The court recognized this
premise as fundamental to tort theories such as assumption of the risk, duty to warn of
a known danger, and strict liability. The court rejected landowner's liability concepts as
the rationale for the fireman's rule. Id.
See also Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968)
(California Supreme Court abolishes landowner liability categories).
54. 20 Cal.3d 202-03, 571 P.2d at 612-13, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 155. See Comment, The
Fireman's Rule: Defining Its Scope Using the Cost-Spreading Rationale, 71 CAL. L,
REV. 218 (1983) (indepth analysis of the Walters decision). See also Berko v. Freda, 93
N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983) (New Jersey Supreme Court extends fireman's rule to
police officers).
55. 20 Cal.3d at 205, 571 P.2d at 612-13, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56. See also Steel-
man v. Lind, 97 Nev. 425, 634 P.2d 666 (1981) (public safety officers assume all risks
inherent in employment by accepting salaries and work benefits and therefore cannot
recover against negligent parties).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol35/iss1/7
EXTINGUISHING THE FIREMAN'S RULE
others.56 Because of this coverage, the court maintained that allowing
an officer additional tort recovery would amount to an award of double
damages.5 7
The Iowa Supreme Court in Pottebaum v. Hinds58 held that a police
officer cannot recover damages for injuries resulting from the negligent
act that necessitated his presence.59 The Pottebaum court rejected the
landowner liability theory' and adopted the public policy rationale.6
56. 20 Cal.3d at 205-06, 571 P.2d at 613, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 156. See also Comment,
supra note 54, at 219 (cost-spreading best supports the fireman's rule on the basis that
the public has "become a self-insurer of its own wrongs").
57. 20 Cal3d at 205-06, 571 P.2d at 613, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 156. According to the
court, abolishing the fireman's rule would also dilute the effectiveness of the public of-
ficers' compensatory scheme and burden the courts with excessive litigation. Id
In his dissent, Justice Tobriner advocated abolishing the fireman's rule. He refuted
the policy consideration on the following grounds: (1) It is unfair to treat firefighters
and police officers as second class citizens by refusing their causes of action. Other
employees can recover damages from third parties in addition to workman's compensa-
tion. Id. at 208-09, 571 P.2d at 615, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 158. (2) The fireman's rule is a
departure from basic negligence in that it rests on the "fortuity that the fire was negli-
gently caused." Id. at 208, 571 P.2d 618, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 161. (3) Although officers
receive compensation, they still encounter an added risk ordinarily not faced absent a
tortfeasor's negligence. Id. at 215, 571 P.2d at 618, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
See also Berko, 93 N.J. at 94-95, 459 A.2d at 670 (the dissent to the majority's exten-
sion of the fireman's rule reiterated the Walters dissent). The Berko dissent further
noted that "[t]o exclude police officers from the scope of potential liability will reduce
the deterrent effect of the civil law against such irresponsible conduct." Id. at 102, 459
A.2d at 674. The public-policy-based fireman's rule is also problematic on the ground
that the rule protects the tortfeasor rather than the police officer "who must thwart the
crime." Id. See generally Comment, Berko v. Freda: The Fireman's Rule Burns Police
Officers, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 195 (1984) (supporting the dissent); Note, Torts - Negli-
gence - Fireman's Rule Applicable to Police Officers, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 759
(1984) (supporting the Berko majority view on extending fireman's rule to cover police
officers).
58. 347 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1984).
59. Id. at 646. Pottebaum, a police officer, sued Hinds, a tavern owner, for injuries
sustained when the officer attempted to quiet a disturbance at Hinds' tavern. l. at 643.
60. Id. at 645. The court rejected premises liability on the grounds that a duty of
care exists despite one's status and that the rule applies only to landowners and occupi-
ers. Thus, third parties could not seek the rule's protection. Id.
61. Id. at 644-45. Although the court conceded that the fireman's rule has evoked
criticism from scholars and judges, "the modern trend is not away from the rule but
toward it." Id. at 644. The court cited recent decisions supporting its holding. Id. See,
e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, (1977) (based
fireman's rule on public policy and assumption of the risk); Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J.
270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960) (based fireman's rule on public policy and assumption of the
risk); Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983) (upheld the fireman's rule and
barred police officer's tort claim).
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The court stated that the fireman's rule protects the public62 by en-
couraging citizens to rely on firefighters and police officers without fear
of private liability.6 3 The court also noted that a citizen has a duty to
summon an officer during an emergency. 64 Thus, in seeking the of-
ficer's help, the citizen should not risk liability to the officer who is
trained and employed to confront certain hazards.65 Furthermore, the
court determined that the fireman's rule assured fairness because work-
ers' compensation and other benefits evenly spread the costs of injuries
among all taxpayers.66
Public policy became the Kansas Supreme Court's sole rationale for
adopting the fireman's rule in Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc.67 The
court held that public policy precludes the injured firefighter from re-
covering damages against a negligent party who caused the hazard that
initially required the officer's presence.6" The court rejected the land-
owner liability69 and assumption of the risk rationales70 as inapplicable
62. See generally Comment, Torts - A Policeman or Fireman Cannot Recover for
Personal Injuries Received When the Negligent Act that Created the Need for the Of-
ficer's Presence Is Also the Direct Cause of His Injury - Pottebaum v. Hinds, 334
DRAKE L. REv. 1109, 1118 (1984) (approving the public policy basis for the fireman's
rule under Pottebaum's facts, but also recognizing that the rule is not the perfect solu-
tion for a case-by-case administration of justice).
63. See Berko, 93 N.J. at 88-89, 459 A.2d at 667 (offends public policy to hold a
citizen liable because he creates the hazard requiring the officer's aid).
64. 347 N.W.2d at 645. The court stated: "A citizen does not have the right to
exclude public safety officers from emergency situations or to control their actions once
they have been alerted to an emergency and arrive on the scene." Id.
65. Id The court maintained that under certain circumstances a citizen has a legal
duty to seek the public officer's help. The court noted the inconsistency and unfairness
of holding the citizen liable for the officer's tort claims because the citizen may simply
be discharging his duty to summon aid. Id.
66. Id. at 645-46. According to the court, the public bears the risks of tort liability
to officers through liability insurance and compensation. Thus, "these risks are more
effectively and fairy spread ... through government entities that employ firefighters and
police officers." Id.
See Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 571 P.2d 602, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152; Berko v.
Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983) (cases using the cost-spreading rationale in
basing the fireman's rule on public policy).
67. 236 Kan. 570, 694 P.2d 433 (1985).
68. Id at 571, 694 P.2d at 438 (firefighter cannot recover against chemical company
and grain elevator for injuries resulting from firefighter's inhalation of poisonous gases
during his performance in the line of duty).
69. Id. at 573-74, 694 P.2d 436-37. The court held that the district court erred in
classifying the firefighter as a licensee at the time of the accident, since licensee cannot
recover damages for a landowner's failure to warn of hidden defects on premises or for a
misrepresentation of the hazard. Id. at 577, 694 P.2d at 439.
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to the firefighters' situation. The court next asserted that the firefighter
receives publicly funded compensation for encountering dangerous
risks.71  Thus, the court reasoned that public policy bars the
firefighter's recovery for injuries attributed to the hazard that requires
him to act in his official capacity.72
In Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace,73 the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land resolved the issue of whether to base the fireman's rule on tradi-
tional landowner liability law or on modem public policy
considerations.74 The court held that public policy provided the best
rationale for the rule.75 Thus, the Maryland public-policy-based fire-
man's rule bars the firefighter's tort claims for injuries sustained due to
the negligently created hazard that necessitated his presence.76
After acknowledging that landowner liability has formed the basis
for Maryland's fireman's rule,77 the court noted that this common law
rationale contained deficiencies78 in two areas. The court first recog-
nized that the premises-liability rationale applies only to landowners
and occupiers. 79 Thus, the fireman's rule, as based on premises liabil-
ity, does not protect negligent nonowners or nonoccupiers from the
firefighter's tort claims.8" For instance, if the court applied the com-
mon law rationale, then two of the Flowers defendants, who did not
own or occupy the building, could not invoke the rule for tort
70. Id at 574-75, 694 P.2d at 437-38. In Calvert, the court refused to extend the
master-servant concept to include the land-occupying taxpayer as the fireman's em-
ployer. See Jackson v. Kansas City, 236 Kan. 278, 680 P.2d 877 (1984) (Kansas
Supreme Court limited the application of assumption of risk to master-servant
relationships).
71. 236 Kan. at 576, 694 P.2d at 438.
72. Id. But cf Christenson v. Murphy, 296 Or. 610, 678 P.2d 1210 (1984) (rejected
public policy and abolished the fireman's rule on the ground that policy considerations
are "merely redraped arguments drawn from premises liability or assumption of the
risk"); Kreski v. Modem Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 151 Mich. App. 376, 390 N.W.2d
244 (1986) (public policy is an unsound basis for fireman's rule).
73. 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).
74. Id. at 439, 520 A.2d at 364.
75. Id. at 447-48, 520 A.2d at 368.
76. Id. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.
77. Id. at 438-40, 520 A.2d at 364-65. See supra note 19-20 for a discussion of
premises liability. Maryland classified firemen as licensees to whom the landowner owes
no duty of care in Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 A. 44 (1925).
78. 308 Md. at 443-44, 520 A.2d at 366-67.
79. Id. at 443, 520 A.2d at 366.
80. Id at 443-44, 520 A.2d at 366.
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immunity.81
The court also demonstrated the inequity of landowner liability clas-
sifications.8 2 Some public officers receive a duty of reasonable care be-
cause they are invitees on the premises. 3 Firefighters, as public
officers entering the premises under the same authority, however, do
not receive reasonable care from the landowner due to their classifica-
tion as licensees.8" Thus, the court abolished the landowner liability
rationale.
To adopt a new rationale, the court turned to the law in other juris-
dictions.8 5 The court examined the assumption of the risk and public
policy theories.86 Relying heavily on Walters and Krauth, the court
agreed that firefighters must confront certain risks on the public's be-
half.8 7 The court held, therefore, that an officer cannot recover dam-
ages for injuries caused by the negligently created hazard during the
course of his duty. 8
Flowers represents a new development of the fireman's rule.89 The
court of appeals boldly abolished the landowner-liability-based fire-
man's rule. The court correctly noted the problems of labeling
firefighters as licensees and other officers as invitees under premises lia-
bility.9" The court erred, however, in failing to examine the weak-
nesses of the public policy rationale as well as the problems of the
fireman's rule itself.91
81. Id. Only one defendant was a building owner. The other defendants, an eleva-
tor manufacturer and security system company, were not premises owners or occupiers..
Id.
82. Id. at 444, 520 A.2d at 366-67.
83. Id. The court cited postal officers and building inspectors as examples of public
officers in the invitee category. Id. at 444, 520 A.2d at 366.
84. Id. at 444, 520 A.2d at 367. According to the court, premises liability law does
not provide a basis for classifying some public officers as invitees and others as licensees.
Id.
85. Id. See, e.g., Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960); Pottebaum v.
Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1984).
86. 308 Md. at 444-45, 520 A.2d at 367.
87. Id. at 438, 520 A.2d at 368.
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 19-75 and accompanying text.
90. -308 Md. at 443-44, 520 A.2d at 366. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying
text.
91. See Tobriner's dissent in Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 152 (1977).
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The court failed to consider the soundness of the public policy ra-
tionale. The public-policy-based fireman's rule is an exception to basic
tort recovery.92 Generally, injured parties are permitted tort recovery
for the defendant's negligent acts.93 The court ignored this basic prin-
ciple and barred an injured firefighter's tort claim against the negligent
defendants.94 Thus, Flowers' public policy rationale contravenes tradi-
tional tort law.95
The public policy rationale could also harm the public at large.
Without the threat of tort liability to firefighters, landowners are less
likely to correct hazardous conditions that may cause injury not only
to firefighters, but to the public as well.96 Thus, more citizens could act
carelessly to create more fires.97
The obvious losers of the Flowers decision are firefighters and the
public. The court simply exchanges one faulty rationale for another.
The public-policy-based fireman's rule is as problematic as the com-
mon law fireman's rule. The court should have abolished the fireman's
rule and applied the general negligence standard of reasonable care.98
By refusing to abolish the fireman's rule, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland upheld the majority view that the rule prevents a firefighter's
tort claim against negligent parties. The court's public policy rationale
indicates a departure from the traditional fireman's rule based on land-
owner liability law.
Dinah M. Dale
92. Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 645-46 (Iowa 1984) (fireman's rule is a
departure from basic negligence).
93. See Waiters, 20 Cal.3d at 207, 571 P.2d at 618, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
94. Id.
95. See dissent in Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983).
96. See, e.g., Walters, 20 Cal. 3d at 202-04, 571 P.2d at 614, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
97. 1ad
98. See Christenson v. Murphy, 296 Or. 610, 678 P.2d 1210 (1984).
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